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Germany’s Contribution to 
Lebanese Sovereignty
Germany is playing a positive role in Lebanon. In the 
aftermath of  the July 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, Ger-
many replaced Italy as lead-nation of  the UNIFIL-II 
Maritime Task Force. Besides being the first in UN 
history, the maritime deployment along the Lebanese 
coast effectively ended the Israeli naval siege, thus 
positively influencing an otherwise skeptical public 
perception in Lebanon of  European engagement in 
the Middle East. After the end of  hostilities, bilateral 
agreements between Germany and Lebanon also 
established the coastal radar organization to strengthen 
the Lebanese government’s authority over its territorial 
waters, and a pilot project to monitor its northern bor-
der with Syria. Both of  these low-profile projects aim 
to provide Lebanon with strengthened “ownership” of  
its national borders. The transfer of  lead-nation status 
of  the Maritime Task Force in February 2008 should 
not affect Germany’s commitments to consolidate the 
coastal radar system and the pilot project. As part of  
the larger political framework to reach a settlement 
in Lebanon, these are all positive German initiatives, 
which the EU could apply to the broader Middle East 
peace process after Annapolis.
The Maritime Task Force (MTF)
For the first time in the United Nations (UN) history, a 
Maritime Task Force (MTF) was deployed along with 
national ground troop contingents. Currently led by 
Germany, the MTF comprises four large vessels with 
an approximate total of  800 crew personnel. Operat-
ing off  the Mediterranean coast of  Lebanon, MTF 
navigates some 5,000 square nautical miles, compared 
to the 300 square miles monitored by UNIFIL ground 
troops. Despite early coordination difficulties and 
suspicions by the local population that its presence was 
to serve Israeli interests, MTF has ultimately succeeded 
in gaining Lebanese support by ending the Israeli sea 
embargo of  Lebanon and projecting a sense of  pro-
fessionalism and impartiality. Moreover, MTF training 
activities for Lebanese Navy personnel and procure-
ment of  adequate equipment began in December 2006.
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The Maritime Task Force, Coastal Radar System and Border Pilot Project
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Seit dem Ende des Israel-Libanon-Krieges im Sommer 2006 leistet Deutschland nicht nur als Führungsnation 
des maritimen Einsatzverbandes der UNIFIL-II-Schutztruppe der Vereinten Nationen einen wichtigen Beitrag 
zur Konsolidierung des Libanon. Im Rahmen der bilateralen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit baut die Bundesre-
publik auch das Küstenradar der libanesischen Marine wieder auf, im Norden des Landes entlang der Grenze zu 
Syrien werden libanesische Soldaten, Polizisten, Zoll- und Grenzbeamte in einem Pilotprojekt an Verfahren des 
integrierten Grenzmanagements herangeführt und ausgebildet. Auch wenn – oder gerade weil – diese Aktivitäten 
weniger im öffentlichen Rampenlicht zu stehen scheinen, sind sie umso mehr geeignet, den Libanesen die Souverä-
nität über ihr eigenes Land und dessen Grenzen zurückzugeben, und sollten daher in bewährter, zurückhaltender 
Weise fortgeführt werden. Die in Brüssel diskutierte Überführung erfolgreicher Pilotprojekte in eine EU-Mission 
könnte dagegen kontraproduktiv wirken.
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Germany’s Contribution to 
Lebanese Sovereignty
Due to the novelty of  a UN naval force, MTF was 
confronted with a lack of  pre-established UN mari-
time operation procedures. These procedures had to 
be created in close communication with the Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF), as well as with the Israeli and 
Syrian Navies. Logistically operating out of  Limas-
sol, Cyprus, MTF has had no official contact with the 
Syrian Navy, which remains highly inactive. Since MTF 
began, the German contingent had open communi-
cation channels with the Israeli Navy, but has been 
confronted with consistent challenges from the Israeli 
Air Force (IAF) and experienced recurrent over-flight 
violations.
Ironically, Israeli violations of  UN Security Council 
Resolution 1701 (August 2006) helped establish early-
warning procedures. The German contingent dem-
onstrated a high degree of  military vigilantism, and 
used standard international frequency to issue warning 
signals to the IAF. After five precarious incidents a five-
mile code of  contact was established with MTF, the 
IAF reduced its over-flights of  the MTF area of  opera-
tions, and now generally restricts aerial training to the 
international open air space. However, it still infringes 
upon Lebanon’s sovereign airspace, often breaking 
the sound barrier in low-altitude passes, and by using 
drones for collecting intelligence. The Israeli Navy also 
maintains ships stationed inside a triangle prohibited 
to Lebanese or international vessels along the maritime 
border, which is delineated by buoys, and has opened 
fire on Lebanese fishing boats considered too close.
Within the MTF Area of  Maritime Operations 
(AMO), primary MTF activities consist of  diverting 
and inspecting suspect ships. Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (MIO) further involve hailing and warn-
ing measures, which are carried out in tandem with 
familiarizing and training the Lebanese Navy officers 
during operation, in accordance with the motto “train 
as you operate.” An important facet of  these measures 
is that of  the 10,000 vessels hailed for inspection, only 
around 40 were considered seriously suspect (though 
none contained weapons), and MTF personnel did not 
board a single one. This means that the Lebanese Navy 
carries out all inspections, thus permitting the MTF to 
maintain a high degree of  neutrality and by extension 
respected credibility from all parties.
Germany has contributed two vessels from the Bre-
men sea police to strengthen Lebanese naval capacity: 
Bremen 2 and Bremen 9, renamed “AMCHIT” and 
“NAQOURA” respectively. Due to their out-dated 
appearance in the Beirut port, it is more likely these 
vessels were tokens of  short-term German support, 
rather than making a serious improvement to the 
Lebanese Navy in the long-term. The Bremen boats 
operate under Lebanese “ownership” and German 
guidance within the inner zone along the coast; the 
larger German frigates navigate in the outer zone.
The Coastal Radar Organization (CRO)
Like the MTF, the Coastal Radar Organization (CRO) 
aims to strengthen Lebanon’s “ownership” of  ter-
ritorial waters. However, whereas MTF is part of  the 
multilateral UNIFIL mission, the coastal radar system 
is based on a separate bilateral agreement between 
Germany and Lebanon. The aim of  the CRO is to 
create and consolidate a chain of  seven radar stations 
with the ability to cover the entire Mediterranean coast 
of  Lebanon. Three of  these stations are older and are 
being refurbished with new equipment and facilities; 
the four other are new installations, all of  which were 
projected to be operational by November 2007. Due 
to the bilateral nature of  the CRO, only Germany is 
training Lebanese officers: training is carried out in 
Germany and then implemented in Lebanon.
Completing the CRO would represent an important 
step to supporting maritime sovereignty, though of  
course it would do little to halt Israeli incursions into 
Lebanese territorial waters. A developed and advanced 
radar system will permit Lebanese authorities to detect 
vessels in their territorial waters, to coordinate posi-
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tions, communicate information, and issue warning 
signals. This system of  detection and possible inspec-
tion was buttressed by the contribution of  10 new 
rapid patrol boats by the United Arab Emirates to 
make rapid sorties from coast to sea for inspections 
and if  need be detention, more of  which will be neces-
sary to consolidate an efficient land-sea coordination 
envisioned with the coastal radar system.
Similar to the low-profile German assistance to the 
northern Lebanese border management, the ultimate 
goal of  German engagement is to provide initial train-
ing, follow-up exercises and transfer the principle of  
“command-and-control” to Lebanon.
The Northern Border Assistance Pilot Project
Like UNIFIL-II, the German Border Police Mission 
in northern Lebanon resulted from UN SC Resolution 
1701, which includes clauses for securing borders and 
interdicting arms smuggling. However, like CRO, the 
“pilot project” emanates from a bilateral understanding 
between Lebanon and Germany. On August 25, 2006, 
Prime Minister of  Lebanon, Fouad Siniora, requested 
support to enhance Lebanese border management 
in an official letter to German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel. The Foreign Minister of  Germany responded 
on September 7, 2006 by sending an initial team of  
ten federal police (5) and customs officers (5) to as-
sess – via a field study – the seaports, airport and land 
crossing points.
The pilot project activities are restricted to a 24 by 
44 km section of  Lebanon north of  Tripoli and thus 
differ geographically from UNIFIL-II, which operates 
in south Lebanon between the Litani River and the 
Blue Line with Israel. The pilot project aims to tighten 
Lebanon’s official “green” border with Syria. Along the 
100 km northern and north-eastern border with Syria, 
the pilot project is assisting in equipping and training 
around 800 Lebanese border police to operate four 
border crossings, from west to east: 1) Ar-Rida, 2) Abu 
Diyeh, 3) Bukayyah, and 4) Qa’a, as well as to moni-
tor the border from observation points. Mobile units 
comprising of  two vehicles with four personnel each 
will also cover the northern hinterland of  Lebanon.
Funded by Great Britain and assisted by a British 
expert, a Common Operation Centre has been cre-
ated to build a common border force, including all 
four Lebanese security branches: the Internal Security 
Forces (ISF), which are to be the civil police and have 
received some 30 vehicles from Canada and 20 from 
Great Britain; the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), to 
patrol the “green” border; the General Security Forces, 
to monitor border immigration; and Customs, to in-
spect the entrance of  goods. Denmark sent two police 
experts and pledged 700,000 € to refurbish Camp 
Aramar near Tripoli, where training of  the Lebanese 
border police began in October 2007. And the United 
States acts as a “silent” partner in assisting with basic 
communication material, such as radios, as well as 
vehicles for the ISF within Beirut proper.
In accordance with the “integrated border manage-
ment” concept, the pilot project thus aims to restruc-
ture and institutionalize a cohesive Lebanese civil 
police border force. To foster better coordination, 
cooperation and communication, the installation and 
operability of  scanners, and training in IT networks 
and visa check devices at the Beirut airport and the 
border crossings went into effect. Though not part 
of  the northern sector, Germany also provided and 
installed a container scanner at the main eastern Leba-
nese border with Syria, known as Masna’a crossing, 
which is meant to facilitate economic trade.
In the preparation and implementation phases of  
procuring equipment and training personnel, the Ger-
man pilot project appears to be laying the groundwork 
for another European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) mission in the Middle East. This option, 
however, is not politically viable in the absence of  
internal Lebanese consensus and Syrian consent. As 
DGAPstandpunkt 2008/01 
Germany’s Contribution to 
Lebanese Sovereignty
such it should be reconsidered, particularly in light of  
the disastrous precedent set by EUBAM-Rafah in the 
Gaza Strip. The suspension of  the ESDP monitoring 
mission seriously undermined EU legitimacy to act as 
a neutral third party: unable to keep the Rafah cross-
ing open, the EU monitors essentially implemented 
Israel’s closure policy, which has severely worsened the 
humanitarian crisis in Gaza. An ESDP mission along 
Lebanon’s land border would irrevocably be perceived 
as implementing steps to pressure and isolate Hezbol-
lah and Syria, with equally foreseeable negative results 
for EU impartiality.
Conclusions
As Germany plans to downsize and become a Troop 
Contributing Country (TCC) to the MTF, other coun-
tries such as Turkey and the Netherlands have been 
mentioned as candidates to take-over. The Turkish 
option would prove problematic politically due to the 
historical implications of  Ottoman occupation, and 
logistically, as Limassol (Greek Cyprus) is the naval 
base for the MTF. Regardless of  which nation relieves 
Germany, the transfer of  the MTF lead-nation should 
not affect in principle the bilateral German assistance 
to the Lebanese coastal radar system or the pilot 
project, both of  which have been effective due to their 
low-profile and perceived non-political nature. Con-
verting the German pilot project into an ESDP border 
assistance or police reform mission may politicize the 
project with further complications for EU engagement. 
For both the CRO and pilot project, German prepara-
tion, training and monitoring should continue until 
Lebanon acquires effective “ownership” capacity.
As the lead country in MTF, Germany is now in a 
positive position to influence future maritime opera-
tions, under the UN or another supra-national banner. 
This experience acquired along the coast of  Lebanon 
– including understanding the importance of  clearly 
projecting impartiality and garnering the support of  
the local population – could possibly serve as a prec-
edent for a similar maritime mission in other related 
regional scenarios, such as along the coast of  the Gaza 
Strip. The political prospects of  such an eventuality re-
main bleak due to the Israeli closure policy, but could 
be seriously explored and advanced by Germany or 
other leading EU Member States in UNIFIL-II, such 
as Spain, Italy or France. Such maritime engagement, 
however, should only be implemented as part of  a seri-
ous comprehensive and just agreement between the 
conflicting parties that includes their explicit consent.
This DGAPstandpunkt is part of a forthcoming report for 
EuroMeSCo about the realities of UNIFIL-II as an example 
of emerging European engagement in the Middle East. It 
is based on research and a series of interviews in Berlin 
and Beirut carried out in Fall 2007, including an official 
visit aboard the BAYERN with Admiral Hans Christian 
Luther, Commander of the Maritime Task Force off the 
coast of Lebanon on 12 October 2007. The opinions 
expressed are those of the authors.
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